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25X1A	2. NASR REPORTEDLY WOULD ACCEPT 12-NATION OVERSEER BOARD ON SUEZ	
	Nasr is willing to accept a compromise on the Suez Canal issue which would include a 12-nation commission to oversee operation of the canal, but which would have no direct operating responsibility.	25X1 25X1
25X1A 25X	posed of six permanent members chosen from the major maritime powers and six members chosen in rotation from among the "lesser powers."	
		25X1

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4. MOLLET MAY RESIGN IF SUEZ OUTCOME UNSATISFACTORY

25X1A

Premier Mollet's personal spokesman told American officials in Paris on 16 August that Mollet feels he would have to resign if the Suez crisis were not resolved to France's satisfaction.

The spokesman said Mollet believes an unsatisfactory outcome of the London conference would undermine France's determination to fight in Algeria and that twin defeats on Suez and Algeria would lead to a real crisis for the Fourth Republic

The American embassy cautions that while this interpretation may be unduly pessimistic, it reflects the views of many responsible Frenchmen. The embassy believes the growing dissatisfaction with the Algerian campaign in France is apt to increase sharply if prospects for an end to the fighting become worse.

Comment

France reacted strongly to the Suez crisis, fearing that another boost to Nasr's leadership would markedly stiffen Moslem resistance to France in Algeria. Should the outcome heighten Nasr's prestige, those who favor an early end to the war in Algeria might gain the upper hand in the National Assembly.

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25X1A	6. TERRORISTS ON CYPRUS ASK FOR TRUCE
	The American consulate general in Nicosia reports that the Cypriot nationalist organization EOKA, which asked for a truce on 16 August "to test the sincerity" of Britain, has not condemned violence and is ready to resume operations if the British response is not favorable.
	The consul general says EOKA may be asking for a truce because the security forces have been making progress against its members and many Cypriots are beginning to be disillusioned with its methods.
25X1A	Greek officials in Athens were taken by surprise by EOKA's action, and the Cyprus ethnarchy representative in Athens also claims to have had no prior knowledge that a truce was to be called. Prime Minister Karamanlis, although pleased at the improved prospects for settling the dispute, has complained that his government should have been consulted so it could have laid the diplomatic groundwork for American support of compromise attempts.
25X1	Cypriot nationalists still maintain that Makarios must be consulted in any planning for the future of the island and probably hope that the British will now return him from exile.

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8. CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY REJECTS POLISH TYPE OF "LIBERATION"

258	1A	
	The central committee of the Czecho- slovak Communist Party, recently instructed editors that an incorrect interpretation of the Soviet 20th Party Congress had led to serious mistakes in Poland and Hungary which, it implied, must be corrected. The central committee warned that the Poznan riots and other events in Poland "teach us a lesson" as to how the "class enemy" exploits weaknesses, such as Poland's "reckless am- nesty."	25X1 25X1
25X1A 25X1A	According to the central committee's instructions, Yugoslavia is not to be taken as a model; wage questions must be handled cautiously, as improvements evoke pressure for more concessions; the bureaucracy should not be attacked in general but only in concrete terms; decentralization is not a panacea and centralization is not bad per se; agricultural collectivization must be speeded up; and the press must weed out numerous "incompetents."	25X1A

Comment

The regime in Prague is still concerned over dissidence, and these instructions support earlier indications that concessions will be kept to a minimum. The Czech implication that the Polish and Hungarian parties must rectify their post-congress "errors" gains interest from the fact that both parties have continued, and possibly accelerated, their liberalization programs.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 20 August)

	stated that King Hussain has accepted an offer from Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to help equip the Jordanian National Guard in building up its defense against Israel. According to the Syrian official, this is separate from a previous offer to replace the British subsidy and provides for aid on a permanent and unconditional
25X1A	basis.
	Israel has doubled and in some cases tripled its production of "military items," according to an official public announcement.
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